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NUISANCE-Unsightly Premises Do Not Afford A Basis For Injunctive Relief.
Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wash.2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964).

Aesthetic values, as a general rule, do not afford a basis
for injunctive relief. They have long been regarded in the
law of nuisance as a matter of luxury and indulgence.1 Also,
the courts have been reluctant to grant injunctive relief solely
on the grounds of unsightliness because of the lack of any objective standard. What offends the sight of any one person
may vary greatly, and, of course, the aesthetic values held in
different areas will also vary. The following case of Mathew2 illustrates the general rule.
son v. Primeau
The defendants in this case lived on a 13-acre tract of
land in a semi-rural area. They raised pigs and had accumulated on their land old automobiles, crates, lumber, old boxes,
and discarded household appliances. Their property was very
unsightly. The plaintiff lived next to the defendants and his
property had been damaged by the trespassing swine and the
comfort and use of his land had been diminished because of
the odor caused by the pigs and the unsightliness of defendant's property. The plaintiff brought an action for damages
and to have limitations placed on the defendants' use of their
land.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages for the
physical invasion of his property by the swine and granted a
permanent injunction restraining the defendants from keeping swine in excess of one boar, two brood sows, and their litters not over six months old. The defendants were also directed
to take certain actions with reference to the unsightly materials they had accumulated on their land.
Shortly thereafter the plaintiff brought another action
claiming violations of the decree and asked that defendants
be found in contempt and the decree be further modified to
enjoin the defendants from keeping any swine. The trial
court found the defendants in contempt but held that they
could escape paying the fine and attorney's fee by disposing of
all the swine kept on their property in excess of one, removing
1. Perry Mount Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Netzal, 274 Mich. 97, 99, 264 N.W.
303 (1936).
2. 264 Wash.2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964).
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all automobiles not currently licensed, and by cleaning up
the piles of wood, crates, etc. Appeal was taken from this
order finding the defendants in contempt together with the
requirements for purgation from the contempt finding.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington dissolved
the injunction insofar as it required the defendants to remove
the old automobiles not currently licensed and clean up the
piles of wood, crates, etc. "That a thing is unsightly or offends the aesthetic sense of a neighbor, does not ordinarily
make it a nuisance or afford ground for injunctive relief.''
The Supreme Court went along with the philosophy expressed
by Judge Kenna in his concurring opinion in the case of
ParkersburgBuilders Material Co. v. Barrack,4 that if aesthetic senses were to be protected, it was not the job of the
courts but a job for the legislative branch through its exercise
of police power. This will be considered in the discussion of
zoning regulation. The main thing to be noted in Mathewson
v. Primeauis that unsightly premises will not afford grounds
for injunctive relief.
Other cases have held essentially the same thing for the
same reasons. Injunctive relief was denied in cases of heavy
equipment parked next to plaintiff's land,' a rough, jagged,
and weed-infested embankment resulting from an excavation,8
deposits of debris, rubbish, and other unsightly material,'
smoke from a plant,' the erection, maintenance, and operation of a standpipe and pumphouse next to a cemetery,' and
many others." Although it must be said that these cases certainly represent the majority view, it cannot be said that the
denial of injunctive relief was based solely upon the courts'
refusal to protect aesthetic senses. Many of the cases involved economic factors. In other words, most courts would
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 189.
118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368, (1937).
Cahill v. Heckel, 189 N.Y. 40, 208 A.2d 651 (1965).
Paul v. Bailey, 87 N.J. Super 201, 137 S.E.2d 337 (1964).
State Road Commission of West Virginia v. Willard L. Oakes, 150 W.Va.
709, 149 S.E.2d 293 (1966).
8. McCarty v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907).
9. Odd Fellows Oakridge Cemetery Ass'n v. Oakridge Cemetery Corp., 14 Ill.
App.2d 378, 144 N.E.2d 853 (1957).
10. Trulock v. Merte, 72 Ia. 510, 34 N.W. 307 (1887); Woodstock v. Hager, 68
Vt. 488, 35 A. 431 (1896); Flood v. Consumers Co., 105 Ill. App. 559 (1903) ;
Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 65 A. 516 (1906); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923); Houston Gas and Fuel Co. v.
Hailow, 297 S.W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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be reluctant, to say the least, to shut down a big manufacturing
plant merely because the smoke emitted from its operations
was unsightly. One could hardly disagree with that philosophy, especially in its application during the period prior to
1950. Other cases denying injunctive relief on the basis of
aesthetic senses can be less easily justified. Most people
would agree that excavations are unsightly; they become even
more so when the dirt removed is not replaced by something.
And most people would feel even more strongly about it if
such a condition existed next to their property. But as long
as the support of the plaintiff's land was not removed, the
court, in the case of Paul v. Bailey,11 refused to do anything
about it. There were no damages until the excavation caused
plaintiff's land to "crack, slide, or fall" and the court would
not grant injunctive relief based on the fact that the embankment was very unsightly.
This seems to be the same logic applied by the court in
Mathewson v. Primeau. There was no doubt that all the old

autos, crates, household appliances, etc., created unsightly
premises. But, injunctive relief was refused on the grounds
that the premises were unsightly. It seems very difficult to
justify refusing injunctive relief when one realizes that clean,
sightly premises are an asset to the neighbors, and the owner's
land will suffer no loss thereby. Yet, it is still the majority
rule that a man's use of his property should be interfered
with as little as possible and the fact that he keeps unsightly
grounds is not reason enough to interfere with that use.
That a condition is offensive to the olfactory senses
alone12 or offensive to hearing alone13 has been held a valid
reason for granting injunctive relief. iowever, when asked
why things offensive to sight alone are not enjoinable, the
courts would probably answer that it is more properly within
the domain of the legislative branch, or because we have no
objective standard, or because what is unsightly varies so
much between men. But it seems that if reasonable men will
not seriously differ about what is offensive to the olfactory
11.
12.

Paul v. Bailey, supra note 6, at 340.
Houghton v. Kenrick, 285 Pa. 223, 132 A. 166 (1926), enjoining a livery
stable.
13. Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938),
enjoining loud jazz music.
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senses or to hearing, they would not disagree about what is unsightly. Most people feel that old, junked cars are unsightly,
as well as old crates and old household appliances strewn
about on one's property. Fortunately, some courts have considered this problem and have come up with the conclusion
that what is unsightly under the proper circumstances may be
enjoinable.
The case of ParkersburgBuilders Material Co. v. Barrack14 may well be the leading case in this area. This case
held that an automobile wrecking yard could not be enjoined
on the ground of unsightliness in an area that was not clearly
established to be residential in nature. But the foundation
was laid for the recognition of aesthetic senses in the law of
nuisance. Judge Maxwell, in that opinion, said:
Of course equity should not be aroused to action
merely on the basis of the fastidiousness of taste of
complainants. Equity should act only where there
is presented a situation which is offensive to the
view of average persons of the community. And,
even where there is a situation which the average
person would deem offensive to the sight, such fact
alone will not justify interference by a court of
equity. The surroundings must be considered. Unsightly things are not to be banned solely on that account. Many of them are necessary in carrying out
the proper activities of organized society. But such
things should be properly placed, and not so located
be unduly offensive to neighbors or to the pubas to
15
lic.

In that statement, Judge Maxwell was not trying to justify
the existence of unsightly conditions; rather, he was pointing
out that they should be so located as to cause the least interference with the use of other people's land. Further, those
unsightly conditions which are necessary to the activities of
society referred to by Judge Maxwell were commercial in
nature. The unsightly premises of the defandents in Mathewson v. Primeau, could not be considered in that category.
14. Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368
(1937).
15. Id. at 371.
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Two other cases which have considered aesthetics in their
6 and Martin v. Williams. 7
opinions are Yaeger v. Traylor"
In the first case the court required that a proposed garage
to be used for parking by hotel patrons be entirely enclosed
and conform in architectural design to the hotel. Further,
ramps were to be avoided and all means of raising and lowering cars were to be within the walls of the building. In
Martin v. Williams, an injunction was granted on the basis of
noise produced, the light, and unsightliness of the objects
and the structures used in connection with the operation of
a used car business. A later law review comment"8 interpreted
this case as holding aesthetic grounds a valid reason for injunctive relief.
The foregoing cases indicate that the law of nuisance
is not completely devoid of the consideration of aesthetics but
in order to advocate more comprehensive recognition of aesthetics in nuisance law the question should be asked if there is
an alternative method or better way to recognize aesthetics.
The answer is yes in most cases; but answering that question
affirmatively does not defeat an advocation that nuisance law
be expanded to recognize aesthetics more fully. Perhaps one
of the most effective methods would be by zoning ordinances
or regulations, except for the fact that in most cases aesthetic
grounds alone will not justify use of the police power. It can
quickly be seen that aesthetics do not manage anywhere near
full protection here either. The case of Fruth v. Board of Affairs of City of Charleston9 is representative of those cases
holding that zoning regulations cannot be based solely on
aesthetic considerations. Prohibition of erecting fences
across the front yards of residential premises was held to be
an aesthetic consideration alone and thus was an invalid exercise of police power."0 It has further been held that, although
aesthetics are a valid consideration in enacting a zoning ordinance, they cannot be the moving factor.2 ' So we have moved
to the point where aesthetics will not in itself justify a zoning
16. 306 Pa. 530, 160 A. 108 (1932).
17. 141 W.Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956).
18. Comment, Nuisance-Aesthetic Grounds Held Valid For Injunctive Relief
Against Lawful Business, 59 W.VA. L. REV. 92 (1957).
19. 75 W.Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915).
20. City of Norris v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. A. 338, 321 S.W.2d 543 (1959).
21. Hitchman v. Oakland Transport, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951).
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regulation but may be considered in combination with other
factors in enacting a zoning regulation.
The above concept has also been expanded in recent years,
however, as can be seen by Opinion of the Justices to the Senate22 dealing with an act establishing historic districts in the
town of Nantucket. Perhaps a more persuasive argument
can be made on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion
2 3 upholding condemnation of certain
of Berman v. Parker,
property under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act
of 1945. That case was interpreted as holding that aesthetics
were a justification for the exercise of police power in a later
case note.24 Other cases more directly holding aesthetics as
valid grounds for exercise of police power are Cromwell v.
5 Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 2 and Naegele OutFerrier,"
door Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka." However, these
cases all applied to prohibitions of commercial signs in certain
areas. The fact remains that aesthetics is being justified as a
valid reason for zoning regulations in an enlarged area. While
this enlargement is still in its infancy, it points to a recognition
on the part of the courts that that which is unsightly, where appropriate, should be restrained. This recognition argues
even more strongly that aesthetics should gain the same respect
in nuisance law. This is so because many areas are still unzoned; and even where an area is zoned, the regulation is often
ineffective to require property owners to keep their premises
clean.
Another method which could be used to prevent unsightly
conditions is the covenant; it is very effective and is being
used more and more to keep a certain area harmonious. It is
limited to the extent that it is usually applied only in areas of
new housing construction. Its limited application keeps it
from being the tool needed to clean up the countryside and
cities.

22. 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
23. 348 U.S. 26, (1954).
24. Bergs, Aesthetics as a Justification for the Exercise of the Police Power or
Eminent Domain, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 730 (1955).
25. 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749 (1967).
26. 168 S.E.2d 117 (Va. 1969).
27. 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
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CONCLUSION
The case of Mathewson v. Primeau was incorrectly decided in that it refused to grant injunctive relief to make the
defendants clean up their premises. It is submitted that
where an action is brought to prevent the keeping of unsightly
property it should not be dismissed on the grounds that injunctive relief cannot be granted to protect aesthetic values.
It is not advocated that everything which is unsightly should
be enjonied. What is advocated is that where there are no great
economic factors to hurdle, the law should recognize that
things can be just as offensive to the sight as they can be
to the senses of smell and hearing. The fact that objective
standards would be difficult to define does not present an obstacle so great as to prevent consideration of the problem. It
it not plausible to say that reasonable men would differ as to
whether the conditions were unsightly when there are old
automobiles, crates, lumber, and discarded household appliances strewn about the property. Mathewson v. Primeau
represents one of many cases where the courts have refused to
apply the nuisance doctrine to unsightly conditions without
any justifiable basis. It has already been shown that zoning
ordinances and the police power have not yet been expanded
enough to deal with the problem. If we are ever to regain the
beauty of our country, everyone must participate. This includes the courts. The nuisance doctrine could be effectively
applied to alleviate many unsightly conditions without encountering any overwhelming problems. The courts should
consider all relevant factors and where conditions exist, as in
Mathewson v. Primeau,injunctive relief should be granted to
make defendants such as the Primeaus clean up their property. Where zoning regulations and covenants have not done
or cannot do the job, the courts should lend a helping hand to
make the countryside and cities more pleasant to look at.
DAVE HOOPER
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